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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate
of HERBERT LEE JONES,

Case No. 860232

Deceased•

BRIEF OF PETITIONER/RESPONDENT
LINDA CAMERON

ISSUES PRESENTED BY APPELLANT FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court commit reversible error in refusing

to hold that there was a confidential relationship between Linda
Cameron and her father Herbert Lee Jones, giving rise to a
presumption that the purported will was procured through her
undue influence?
2.

Did the lower court err in not holding that the

purported will was presumed to have been procured through the
undue influence of Linda Cameron on the grounds that she drafted
the document and was the sole beneficiary thereunder?
3.

What is the scope of appellate review in this case?

4.

Was the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to

overcome a presumption that the purported will was procured by
the undue influence of Linda Cameron?
5.

Even if the document dated 1 May 1985 is the valid of

the decedent, is Robert Lee Jones entitled to inherit as a
pretermitted child under Utah Code Ann. 75-2-302.
6.

Does the language in the 1 May 1985 document drafted by

-2Linda Cameron demonstrate the intent of the decedent to
disinherit his son, Robert Lee Jones?
7•

Did the trial court err in admitting extrinsic evidence

for the purpose of overcoming the presumption against
disinheritance created by Utah Code Ann. 75-2-3-2(1)(a)?
8.

Did Herbert Lee Jones devise substantially all of his

to or for the exclusive benefit of the mother of Petitioner
Robert Jones or did he provide for his son by other transfer?
9.

Did the lower court err in finding that the purported

will was signed as a will and that it was not altered after May
1, 1985?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Petitioner Robert Lee Jones has appealed from the Formal
Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal Representative
entered on April 15, 1986, by the Third Judicial District Court
for the District of Salt Lake County, the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson, presiding.

The Formal Probate of Will has the effect

of excluding Robert Lee Jones from his father and of giving the
entire estate to Petitioner Linda Cameron.
B.

Disposition of the Case Below

On July 19, 1985, Petitioner/Respondent Linda Cameron filed
a Petition for Formal Probate of Will and Appoint of Personal
Representative.

The decedent, Herbert Lee Jones had died on

July 25, 1985.

Accompanying the petition was a document dated

-3May 1, 1985 which the court later admitted for probate as the,
will of the decedent.

(R. 5-7). On August 6, 1985,

Petitioner/Appellant Robert Lee Jones filed an Objection to
Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment of Personal
Representative: and Counter Petition for Formal Appointment of
Special Administrator.

(R. 9-14).

The matter was referred to

the trial division of the district court and trial was held on
February 10, 1986, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
The court ruled finding facts substantially in favor of
Petitioner/Respondent Linda Cameron.

(R. 110-113).

On April

15, 1986, the court entered the Formal Probate of Will and
Appointment of Personal Representative from which
Petitioner/Respondent Robert Lee Jones has appealed.

(R114-

115).
C.

Statement of Facts

Linda Cameron and Robert Lee Jones are the surviving
children of Herbert Lee Jones who died on July 5, 1985 at the
age of 71, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

For

approximately two months prior to his death he resided in Salt
Lake County.

Prior to May, 1985, he lived substantially all of

his life in California.

Although he lived alone, he operated a

salvage grease busines in which he drove all over Southern
California to retrieve used restaurant grease which was sold for
re-processing.

He was divorced and died single.

-4The will that was admitted to probate by the district court
was drafted in La Puente Valley Hospital, West Covina,
California and signed by the decedent on May 1, 1985 .
been admitted to the hospital for major surgery.

He had

Linda Cameron

found out that her father was in the hospital and travelled to
California, arriving on April 30, 1985.

It was the first time

she had been to see her father for several years although she
had been in telephone contact with him calling once or twice a
month.

(Tr. 38-39).

Realizing that her father would have a

lengthy convalescence, she spent much of the night of April 30
going through her fatherfs business papers so that some
disposition could be made.
father at the hospital.

On May 1, 1985 she visited her

Her father had her prepare a document,

in her handwriting which stated:
I, HERBERT LEE JONES, grant power of ATTORNEY to my
daughter: LINDA M. CAMERON.
(Tr. 10-13).

The document was left unsigned and put aside.

Mrs. Cameron then had further discussions with her father.
The details of the grease business were discussed, to include
who should collect the grease from whom and when.

(Tr. 19).

The decedent also indicated that he wanted his son Robert Lee
Jones to have no part of his property.

Mrs. Cameron then

indicated to him that if that was his desire, he would need a
will.

He so indicated.

Mrs. Cameron then changed the period on

the previously drafted document to a comma and added the words

-5"AND TO BE EXECUTER (sic) AND SOLE BENEFICIARY TO MY ESTATE/'
(Tr. 19-20).

After the decedent had a chance to examine the

document, he acknowledged it as his will and signed it in its
complete form as it was submitted to the court in the presence
of Mrs. Cameron, Volita Jones, and Terri Hurst.

Volita Jones

and Terri Hurst also signed the will as witnesses in each
other's presence.
Prior to the signing of the will and on numerous occasions,
the decedent had indicated that he wanted to exclude Robert Lee
Jones from receiving any part of his estate.

Volita Jones

testified of her longstanding friendship with decedent and his
frequent mention of an incident where Robert had taken money
from the decedent's safe deposit box.

(Tr.82-83).

The

decedent's brother, Spenser Jones also testified as to the
decedent's disappointment that his son had stolen from him and
his desire that Robert should receive nothing.

(Tr. 107-108).

At trial, petitioner/appellant presented testimony that he
had not seen seen his father for about six years prior to his
father's death even though he lived only about fifteen miles
from his father.

He testified that he thought his father was

incapable of handling his affairs, but that was also based on
incidents which occurred in 1979.

(Tr. 187-198).

Testimony was

presented by George Throckmorton that he believed that the
second portion of words was written by someone different than
the one who wrote the first portion.

That was contradicted by

-6eyewitness testimony that Mrs. Cameron had written both portions
and that the entire document was in its present form at the time
it was signed.

(Tr. 85, 9 5 ) . Both Mr. Throckmorton and a Chris

Andrew testified that they believed that the second portion of
the will had been traced over with a different color ink.

Both

however conceded that no change in words had taken place.

(Tr.

130, 152).
Based on the testimony given to the court, it generally
found the issues in favor of Linda Cameron and entered its
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law.

(R. 110-112).

The court found that there was no confidential relationship
between Linda Cameron and her father prior to the signing of the
will.

It found that the entire document had been completed

prior to the time of its signing by the decedent and the
witnesses.

The court also found that the will was not procured

by the undue influence of any person.

The Court entered the

Formal Probate of Will and Appointment of Personal
Representative on April 15, 1986.

This appeal is from that

decision.
ARGUMENT
I
ANY INTERPRETATION OF A WILL SHOULD USE AS ITS
PRIMARY GUIDE THE INTENT OF THE TESTATOR.
Section 75-1-102(1) of the Utah Uniform Probate Code states
that "This code shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies."

At subsection

-7(2) it is stated that "The underlying purposes and policies of
this code are:

... (b)

To discover and make effective the

intent of a decedent in the distribution of his property."

The

legislature made no comment on this section of the uniform code
at the time of adoption.

That is certainly understandable in

light of this court's history of decisions.

For example this

court in In re Poppletonfs Estate. 97 P 138, that the rules of
construction used in interpreting wills should yield to clearly
expressed intent on the part of the testator.
merely guides to help find a testator's intent.

Those rules are
More recently

in In re Wallich's Estate. 420 P 2d 40, this court stated that a
testator's intent should be of "paramount" interest.
In interpreting the will which is the subject of this
appeal, this court should resist the temptation to follow strict
technical points of law where such interpretation serves to
obscure the intent of the testator.

The law should be a guide

to ascertain that intent, not a shield to obscure it.
II
NO MATTER WHAT THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THERE IS AN
ADEQUATE FACTUAL BASIS TO SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDINGS THAT THE MAY 1, 1985 DOCUMENT WAS THE
PROPERLY EXECUTED WILL OF THE DECEDENT.
Petitioner/appellant has urged the court to review the
findings of fact in this case as a court of equity.

The case of

In the Matter of the Estate of Hock, 655 P 2d. 1111 (1982) has
been cited.

The footnote at page 1114 is most enlightening when

-8read in its entirety.

The court stated:

"In an equity proceeding, we do not engage in a
review of the evidence which duplicates the task of
the trial cour.t. Rather we assess the quality and
quantity of the evidence to determine whether it
'clearly preponderates against' the trial court's
finding that the appropriate standard of proof has
been satisfied. We apply this standard of review in
cases involving trusts which arise by operation of law
and in which the the standard of proof is one of
clear and convincing evidence."
The court also goes on to state that where the lower had to
apply the more stringent "clear and convincing" standard to its
analysis, it need apply a lesser standard of review.
not the case here.

That is

The lower court in this case did not apply

the "clear and convincing" standard neither did this case
involve questions concerning resulting trusts.
In any event, there was a strong basis for the court's
findings that the May 1, 1985 document was indeed the decedent'
will.

Linda Cameron and Volita both testified that the deceden

examined the will and indicated that it was as he wanted it.
Both testified that Herbert Lee Jones signed the will in the
presence of Volita Jones and Terri Hurst.

Both indicated that

the witness signed the document in Herbert's presence.
26, 84-85).

(Tr. 25

The only evidence offered to the contrary was that

of Mr. George Throckmorton that he believed the will had been
written by two different people and that some part of it had
been traced.

Mr. Throckmorton himself admitted that he could

not be sure of his conclusion and that he was not present at th
signing.

(Tr. 150-152).

Volita Jones, an impartial witness wa

-9emphatic that the will she witnessed was there in its entirety
when she signed it.

(Tr.

85, 95).

Taken as a logical whole, the testimony gave the trier of
fact a full and adequate basis to find as it did.

In the

absence of clear error on the part of the factfinder, its
finding should not be disturbed by this court.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE WILL WAS
NOT PROCURED BY THE UNDUE INFLUCENCE OF ANY PERSON.
Undue influence of the magnitude to invalidate a will has
been defined by this court as follows:
"Mere general or reasonable influence over a
testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to
have that effect the influence must be 'undue.1 The
rule as to what constituted 'undue influence' has been
variously stated, but the substance of the different
statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will,
the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as
to destroy his free agency and make him express the
will of another, rather than his own. The mere
existence of undue influence, or an opportunity to
exercise it is not sufficient; such influence must be
actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard
to the execution of the will in question, either at
the time of the execution of the will, or so near
thereto as to be still operative, with the object or
procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and
it must result in the making of testamentatry
dispositions which the testator would not otherwise
had made." In re Brvan's Estate. 25 P 2d (1933).
The focus therefore of any inquiry into the possibility of
someone exerting undue influence over a testator should be on
two things.

The inquiry must look at what the person intent was

and whether it was overborn.

The inquiry must also look at the

-10moment that the will in question was executed.
The trial court found that there was no confidential
relationship between Linda Cameron and Herbert Lee Jones and
therefore no presumption of undue influence.

The evidence

before the court indicated that while the decedent certainly
trusted his daughter, she had little or no opportunity to have
any relationship with her father prior to the signing of the
will.

She had not even seen him for several years.

had the opportunity to talk to him on the phone.

She only

The testimony

was that the decedent ran a fairly complex business without any
assistance.

Testimony brought forth by appellant about Linda

Cameron running the business was only effective after the
decedent sign the will.

While the appellant has cited extensive

case law citing various examples of confidential relationships
being assumed or presumed, none of them corresponde to the facts
of this case.

All involved a longstanding relationship which

existed before the challenged will or document was signed.
The other focus of inquiry is that of whether the
decedent's desires were actually overborn.

The natural objects

of the decedent's bounty were his two children.

Appellant laims

that Linda Cameron forced her father to exclude him.

The

evidence at trial was clear that the decedent did not want his
son Robert Lee Jones to take any part of his estate.

Linda

Cameron testifies that the whole purpose of the will was to
conform to her father's desire that "Bobby" not get anything.

-11(Tr. 17-17).

Volita Jones testified that the decedent

frequently expressed that same desire to exclude his son*
82-82).

(Tr.

The decedent's brother also testified as to Herbert's

desire to exclude "Bobby."

(Tr. 107). Thus it is clear that

the will which did in fact give nothing to the appellant was
consistent with the decedent's wishes.

The finding of no undue

influence by the court is thus factually supported no matter
what the effect of any presumptions.
It must be noted that even where a presumption of undue
influence exists, that merely shifts the burden onto a
confidential advisor to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that no fraud or undue influence was exerted.
Estate, 293 P 2d 682 (Utah 1956).

See In re Swan's

The trial court had the full

benefit of argument of both counsel concerning presumptions of
undue influence or the lack thereof.

While the trial judge in

his ruling did not specifically make any rulings concerning
presumptions, his ruling that the will was not procured by undue
influence coupled with the abundant evidence that the decedent's
will was not overborn appears to be that the preponderance of
evidence was that no fraud or undue influence was exerted.
IV.
THE LANGUAGE OF THE WILL WITHOUT THE AID OF
EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THE
DECEDENT'S INTENT TO DISINHERIT HIS SON ROBERT LEE JONES.
Secton 75-2-302, Utah Code Annotated provides that:
"If a testator fails to provide in his will for any of
his children or issue of a deceased child, the omitted
child or issue receives a share in the estate equal in
value to that which would have received if the

-12testator had die intestate unless: (a) It appears
from the will that the omission was intentional;"
Robert Lee Jones claims his intestate share as a pretermitted
heir pursuant to this statute.

This section comes from the

probate code and no Utah Supreme Court cases of record have yet
discussed it.
In examining the appellant's claim that he should take his
intestate share of his father's estate as a pretermitted heir,
this court can profitably turn to a preliminary question which
was also decided by the trial court.

The appellant contested

his father's mental capacity to effectively dispose of his
property.

In examining that question, the court was presented

with the definition of mental capacity that this court has
established.

The true test of testamentary capacity is whether

a testator "is able to remember who were the natural objects of
his bounty, recall to mind his property, and make disposition of
it understandingly according to some purpose or plan formed in
his mind", In re Swan's Estate, 293 P 2d 682, (Utah 1956).

The

evidence concerning the decedent's desire to give his son no
part of his property was properly admitted to show that the
decedent understood that he had a son.
forgotten that that he had a son.

He had not inadvertently

Almost immediately following

those statements, the decedent signed a will giving his entire
estate to his daughter to the exclusion of that son he had
acknowledged.

What should be inferred from this.

The most

logical interpretation is that the decedent intentionally

-13-

omitted his son from his will.

When viewed against the capacity

which the decedent must have had, that is the only logical
interpretation which can be reached from the language of the
will.
That logic is in conformance with Utah case law.

In the

case of In re Newellfs Estate, 5 P 2d 230, (Utah, 1931), the
court stated that "language of a will and bequests may be of
such character as to lead to but one conclusion, that all others
except those mentioned were intended to be excluded."

The court

then cited as an example an Illinois case where the will made no
mention of the children of the testator in a his will, but gave
the entire estate to the testator's wife.

The Illinois court

held that "language could not have been used which would more
clearly express an intention that the wife and she alone was to
take and hold the testator's estate to the exclusion of all
others including his children."

See Hawhe v. Chicago and W.I.R.

Co. , 4 6 N.E. 240, cited in Newell, supra at 237.
The court in Newell admitted extrinsic evidence in an aid
to determine the intent of the decedent.
further.

That will be discussed

The court found that when multiple bequests were made,

the Hawhe rule might not apply and thus according to the facts
of the case felt it necessary to dig further.
in this case made a similar analysis.

The trial court

It found that the

language of the will alone was sufficient to show the decedent's

-14intent to exclude Robert Lee Jones but also added a finding that
the consideration of extrinsic evidence would only buttress that
conclusion.

Inasmuch as the defendant opened the door to the

admission of extrinsic concerning the decedent's intent
concerning his son by challenging the decedent's capacity and
advocating that the will was invalid because of undue influence,
the trial court could properly make such a ruling.

In the

absence of clear error, this court should sustain that ruliing.
V.
ALTHOUGH UNNECESSARY, EXTRINSIC COULD PROPERLY BE CONSIDERED
BY THE TRIAL COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE
DECEDENT INTENDED TO EXCLUDE ROBERT LEE JONES FROM
TAKING ANY PART OF HIS ESTATE.
Any discussion of pretermitted heirs and the comsideration
of extrinsic evidence in ascertaining any testator's intent
requires an inquiry into the history of the issue.

The various

state statutes on the subject have been classified in two
categories, the Missouri type and the Massachussetts type.
Under the Missouri type statute parole evidence is not
admissible to show that the testator had not merely forgotten
the omitted child—the question is simply whether the child was
name or provided for in the will, and if not he takes his
intestate share under the statute.

The Massachussetts type

statute provides that a child omitted from a testator's will may
take his intestate share unless it appears that the omission was
intentional and not occasioned by accident or mistake.
evidence is admissible to show that intent.

Parol

Atkinson, Law of

-15Wills, ch. 3 (2d ed 1953) cited in In re Hilton's Estate, 649 P
2d 488 (N.M. 1982).
The appellant relies heavily on the Hilton case inasmuch as
it interprets a New Mexico statue which in language is identical
to the Utah pretermitted heir statute.

The key to the New

Mexico court's decision that parol evidence is inadmissible is
to be found in the prior New Mexico case law rather than the
unique wording of the Utah and New Mexico statutes.
has a history of following the Missouri rule.

New Mexico

Both Missouri and

Massachussetts type statutes are based on the theory that if a
testator failed to name or mention a child, he overlooked or
forgot to name the child and thus the child is entitled to a
presumption of the same.

The framers of the original Uniform

Probate Code extended the protection of that presumption only to
children born after the execution of the will.

Both New Mexico

and Utah adopted a change which extended that presumption to
children born before the execution of the will.

Both adopted

the more specific section at issue, 75-2-3©2(a) without change
or comment.

The framers of the code in their editorial comment

or the section stated that "This section is not intended to
alter the rules of evidence applicable to statements of a
decedent."
What then was the decision of the New Mexico court in
Hilton.

The court ruled that a no contest clause in the will

adequately expressed the testator's intent to disinherit certain

-16of his grandchildren.

In dicta the court said that extrinsic

evidence was not admissible, but cited earlier case law based on
it history using a Missouri type statute.

It stated in dicta

that the disposal of the entire estate to one or more persons
was not sufficient to indicate an intent to disinherit the
grandchidren.

It cited its own Missouri type heritage in so

stating as well as citing case law from another state which had
a Missouri type statute, Oklahoma.
Utah has a past history of following the Massachussetts
rule.

The most recent case is that of In re Newell's Estate,

supra.

We have already discussed the Newell case as to how it

contradicts the New Mexico and Oklahoma rules.

Under some

circumstances, the bequest of the entire estate to one person is
adequate to show the testator's intent to disinherit.

It also

sums up prior Utah case law validating the principal that
extrinsic evidence is admissible to ascertain the testator's
intent.

The earlier cases of Coulam v. Doull, 9 P 568 and In re

Atwood's Estate, 45 P 1036 are cited in Newell.
The question thus becomes whether or not the legislature
when it passed 75-2-302 intended to discard the past Utah
tradition of allowing extrinsic evidence.
were made at the time of adoption.

No published comments

The legislature did however

state that the code should be liberally construed to ascertain
what the decedent intended.

See 75-1-102, Utah Code Annotated.

The better reasoned rule is that evidence should be

-17admitted on the question of intent.
VI.
WHEN AN OMITTED CHILD CHOOSES TO CONTEST A WILL
RATHER THAN ELECT TO TAKE HIS INTESTATE SHARE,
THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE WHOLE PROBLEM RATHER THAN
SEPARATE EVIDENCE FOR DIFFERENT PURPOSES.
When a child is omitted from a will, he has a right to
contest the will if he reasonably believes that there were
defects in the preparation or execution of the will.

The

omitted child also has rights under the pretermitted heir
statute although they may be extinguished.

The issues which m

be raised differ depending on the choice of the omitted child.
Here, the appellant chose to challenge the capacity of his
father to make a will.

He also chose to challenge the will as

being procured under influence.

That challenge opend the door

for the admission of extensive evidence to show that the
decedent understood that he had a son "and that he wanted to
exclude him from receiving any part of his estate.
The appellant thus asks the court to consider extensive
evidence on one subject but asserts that it is totally
irrelevant on a similar subject.

This places a very difficult

burden on the factfinder to consider the intent of the testato
and then disregard.

It is logically inconsistent as well.

Logically, the appellant can be said to have given up some of
the protections of the pretermitted heir statute when he chose
to challenge the will.

Such waiver is similar to the rights o

a criminal defendant to refrain from testifying.

When he

-18chooses to testify he gives up the right to remain silent and
subjects himself to cross-examination.
Robert Lee Jones made the decision to challenge the will
and admit extensive evidence as to his father's dislike of his
son.

Having made that choice, the appellant should be content

to allow the factfinder to use that evidence for all purposes.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly examined the facts surrounding the
execution of the will.

The will was signed in the presence of

two qualified witnesses who also signed in the testator's
presence.

The will that was signed is the will which was

admitted to probate.
There was no confidential relationship between the decedent
and Linda Cameron at the time the will was signed.

Even if

there was a confidential relationship, it does not necessarily
give rise to a presumption of undue influence.

There was

abundant evidence to rebut any presumption of undue influence.
The will without the aid of extrinsic evidence was
sufficient to show the testator's intent to exclude his son
Robert Lee Jones from the estate.

The extrinsic which was

admitted at trial for other purposes would have buttressed the
finding that the decedent wished to exclude his son.

That

evidence could and should have been considered for all purposes,
particularly in that appellant opened the door for its
admission.

-19Accordingly, Respondent Linda Cameron urges this court to
affirm the decision of the trial court to admit the May 1, 1985
will to probate and to exclude Robert Lee Jones according to its
terms.
Dated t h i s

UJ~

day

of

flJttfM^Aec.

1986.
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